Editor’s Note: The Selective Echo is pleased to feature Peter Golub, a highly talented young scholar of Russian literature and philosophy, in a Q&A about the South Ossetia conflict that has been dominating international news this summer. Peter, 26, was born in Moscow and moved to Salt Lake City with his family as a young boy. He is a graduate of of the University of Utah and went on to the master of fine arts program at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas. His poetry and translations are gaining steadily in reputation. He has published translations of Russian poetry in St. Peterburg Review, Circumference, Cimarron Review, Caketrain, Jacket, Words Without Borders, Asheville Poetry Review, Absinthe: New European Poetry, Taiga, Zone, Rhino, Zoland, and Diagram. In 2007 a bilingual edition of his poems, My Imagined Funeral, was published in Russia.

Peter agreed to answer a few questions about the most recent conflict. I agree that the coverage of the conflict by Western media has been extraordinarily shoddy, especially in establishing erroneous contexts and irrelevant analogies. In particular, Peter has been most disturbed by the near-complete absence of reports on the Battle of Tskhinvali. The conflict, as Peter rightly asserts, is a shocking exemplar of the destructive rotten core of politics. Certainly no admirer of Putin, Peter targets Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgian president, as the primary aggressor. And, I quote directly from Peter’s blog: “There is nothing more craven than using civilian lives in order to instill pity in your allies. Of course, this doesn’t mean that I don’t love Georgia, or that I support Medvedev or Putin.” You can learn more about Peter here.

SE: Why has Russia decided to use South Ossetia to demonstrate his force? And, what does that suggest about its long-term geopolitical strategy?

PG: First off, the conflict in Ossetia can be traced back to 19th century when the Ossetians (a small ethnic minority) decided to fight against Georgian tribes on the side of the Russian Empire, and with the backing of the Russian Empire the Ossetians were able not only to defend their small mountainous region but also expand the borders of their small state.

Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union Stalin split Ossetia into north and south, the north would remain in Russia and the south would go to Georgia. I do not know the geography precisely, but I assume that the southern regions of Ossetia were won during the fighting in the 1800s. The Ossetians, for the most part, did not fight this division, and it was the Abkhazians who really resisted being subsumed into the new Soviet Georgia. So, first of all, we must be conscious of the fact that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia were essentially given to Georgia by Stalin (who, of course, himself was a Georgian).

Now with the collapse of the Soviet Union, fighting broke out in Ossetia and the region tried to separate from Georgia in 1992. A peace agreement was signed that year. Part of the agreement was that a trilateral peacekeeping force–Ossetian, Georgian, and Russian–would be stationed near the capital of Ossetia, Tskhinvali. The deal was that geographically South Ossetia would remain a part of Georgia. However, South Ossetia, like Abkhazia, would elect its own president, and basically act as an autonomous region.

Now, the Russians since that time have wanted the regions of Abkhazia and Ossetia to be declared autonomous, which essentially means go back into Russia’s borders. Both the Abkhazians and the Ossetians agree with this, and recently visited the Russian Duma when its members voted to declare the regions autonomous.

Medvedev and Putin could not dream of a better occasion to exert Russia’s geopolitical influence. And, of course, the Russians were ready to use this occasion after the independence of Kosovo. In the eyes of most Russians, the carving out of Kosovo and the declaration of its independence is exactly the same situation as that of the separatist regions in Georgia. Hence, Russia feels that if the United States can achieve its political objectives by taking the role of benevolent superpower, then they can do the same.

As I mentioned above the Ossetian conflict precedes Kosovo, but after Kosovo it was sure to happen. It was expected by most Russians that Russia would eventually go into Abkhazia and South Ossetia. So when Saakashvili shelled Tskhinvali is was actually a pretty smart political move. Thing is, he knew the Russians were already going in there. Most of the Ossetians were already Russian citizens, and the Ossetian army was trained, armed, and funded by the Russian military -Russia was a lot of control over the region. Now, by shelling Tskhinvali, Saakashvili provoked Russia and caused them to respond in typical Russian fashion. So, now Russia looks like the aggressor, and Georgia is the small injured nation. With the support of the West, and especially the United States–Georgia is the United States’ third largest ally in Iraq–Saakashvili thought it would be impossible for him to lose face.

So, to return to your initial question: Why has Russia decided to use South Ossetia to demonstrate its force? And, what does that suggest about its long-term geopolitical strategy?

Medvedev and Putin used South Ossetia because it is one of the few regions where Russia has the support of people in another country, people who want Russia to come in and “rescue” them. Think of Medvedev going into Kazakhstan or even Azerbaijan -it would never happen. Here Medvedev can have his cake and eat it too. He is justifying the invasion on the basis of the Ossetian support of Russia, and he is showing the world that simply because someone is a United States ally does not mean they have total support.

In this sense there was a trade-off for the Russians: Russia was embarrassed because most western news sources took the side of Georgia, but the United States was embarrassed as well, because it could not protect its ally. In the mind of men like Putin this is a good deal -Russia has embarrassed a very big player, by allowing a very small player a PR victory. Also, it should be remembered that unlike President Bush, both Medvedev and Putin have very high approval ratings inside Russia, and this war has only made them seem stronger and the United States weaker. In the Russian public’s eyes Medvedev and Putin are heroes.

SE: Already several American politicians, including McCain, had tried to contextualize the conflict in familiar analogies such as the Soviet invasions of Budapest and Prague. Why are such analogies fool-hardy?

PG: Well, for one thing Europe depends on Russia for most of its oil and gas. So, obviously one could not imagine using sanctions or other Cold War economic tactics against Russia. Also, America has long ago won the culture war against Russia. Many Russians idealize American stars, and in general Russia does not want bad relations with the United States, it just wants to be respected as an equal partner in the world.

To me the Cold War stuff is just McCain campaign rhetoric that will fizz out after November’s elections.

SE: What should be the proper diplomatic response with regard to the conflict and to the longer-term issues of sovereignty and moral diplomacy?

PG: This is a good question. Like I mentioned above, it is crucial that Russia is respected as an equal partner, that it is not demonized by the United States and Europe. Like I said, Russia loves American culture, and has always emulated high western culture -at first they all learned French and now everyone learns English. So first it must be understood that Russia want to be allies with the United State, but only it if is respected, listened to, and negotiated with as an equal partner.

The second part of your question, about “the longer term issues” is very important. If Russia feels itself to be isolated, if NATO is brought to its borders, etc. then there could be real problems. One thing to keep in mind is that during the 2005 presidential standoff in Ukraine, there were two uprisings: the Orange Revolution, which was publicized in the west, and the Blue Revolution which was of course publicized heavily in Russia. Many Ukrainian’s living east of Kiev supported Russia backed president: Viktor Yanukovych. The eastern, industrial, part of Ukraine has always had very strong ties with Russia, and from time to time there is talk of splitting Ukraine into two separate regions. Now this is of course crazy, and would have enormous political implication, far greater than the current conflict. But if Russia starts feeling pressured, and if the paranoia reaches a sort of boiling point, then it is not impossible that Medvedev and Putin would not take steps to annex parts of the Ukraine. Again, I do not think the scenario with the Ukraine is likely, but in order to make sure that it is not even on the table, Russia must be treated as an ally not an enemy.

SE: What does the conflict suggest about perceptions of national character not just of Russia but also of the United States and the West in general?

PG: I myself was very saddened when I first saw the coverage of the conflict. Thing is, I actually have relatives living in Tskhinvali and their home was destroyed by Georgian artillery, but I did not hear a word of this mentioned in the news. Here I was talking with my cousin and his wife, who were now taking care of her shell shocked grandparents, and there was not a word about it in the major news sources. So that was a personal disappointment for me, and it was the first time when the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal really fell in my eyes. I know they have made mistakes in the past, but this is when it really hit home.

But all in all I think this has greatly hurt Russia’s image abroad, and this saddens me very much. My hope is that all the Cold War rhetoric will die down. That Russian peacekeepers will remain in South Ossetia, and that with the support of more than just Russia, South Ossetia will eventually break away from Georgia. This is what my relatives that live in Tskhinvali want, and I guess I am going to have to take their side against that of Saakashvili. But I also pray that Russia does not try to take the region by force, because this move will inevitably isolate Russia, and make it that much harder to see Russia as an ally.